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PREVIEW; State v. LaFournaise**
Brian Hagan*
**Editor’s Note: This preview discusses potentially triggering
material involving sexual violence.
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in State v.
LaFournaise on Wednesday, December 8, 2021 at 9:30 am via Zoom.1
Chad Wright is expected to appear on behalf of defendant and appellant,
Toston Gray LaFournaise. Austin Miles Knudsen, Katie F. Schulz, Leo
Gallagher, and Katie Jerstad are expected to appear on behalf of plaintiff
and appellee, the State of Montana.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Toston Gray LaFournaise appeals from his conviction under
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503 (2015), sexual intercourse without consent,
in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County.2 State v.
LaFournaise is a cautionary tale on the importance of knowing which law
applies in a criminal case based on the date of the offense. The Montana
Supreme Court will review: (i) whether an amendment to the information
during LaFournaise’s trial was one of substance or form;3 and (ii) whether
harmless error occurred where the jury instructions failed to require a
finding of force.4 For the reasons discussed below, I anticipate an
affirmation of LaFournaise’s conviction by the Court.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

LaFournaise began sexually harassing a child named S.S. when he
was in seventh grade and she was in sixth.5 He left her unwelcome notes,
inappropriately touched her buttocks, and forced kisses upon her.6 S.S.
filed four formal complaints with the school. S.S.’s parents, aware of the
situation, met with school administration, who suspended LaFournaise

* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law Class of 2023.
1
The argument will be live-streamed and can be accessed through the Court's website at
http://strearn.vision.net/MT-JUD/.
2
Brief of Appellant at 6, State v. LaFournaise, No. DA 19-0453 (Mont. May 12, 2021)
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/ getDocByCTrackId?DocId=353285.
3
Id. at 1; See generally City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602 (Mont. 2002).
4
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1; See generally City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219
(Mont. 2020).
5
Brief of Appellee at 2, State v. LaFournaise, No. DA 19-0453 (Mont. Aug. 11, 2021),
https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=36245.
6
Id. at 3.
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three times for his acts. Even after LaFournaise moved on to high school,
S.S. found a new note from him on her locker.7
In the fall of 2015, as S.S. walked home from volleyball practice,
LaFournaise rode up to her on his bicycle, jumped off, and pushed her to
the ground.8 He told her he was going to hurt her. She screamed for him
to get off her. He pinned her arms above her head with one hand, and with
the other pulled down S.S.’s and his own shorts. He inserted his penis into
her vagina and raped her. He then cut a wound on her leg with a knife and
told her that he would kill her if she told anyone. Because she believed
him, she did not initially report the rape.9
LaFournaise continued to call S.S. in the summer of 2016 until
she blocked his number.10 Somehow, in 2017, the telephone unblocked
LaFournaise’s number, and he was able to call her again. He told her that
he planned to rape her again and impregnate her, and that he “knew where
to find her.”11 S.S.’s terror and anxiety resulting from this phone call led
her to reveal the rape to her parents and school officials.12
On May 24, 2018, the State charged LaFournaise with sexual
intercourse without consent (Count I), misdemeanor privacy in
communications (Count II), and misdemeanor stalking (Count III).13
Before trial, the State amended the information twice, first to add a penalty
enhancement to Count I due to bodily injury, and then to amend the charge
to aggravated sexual intercourse without consent.14
The problem noticed by the district court on the first day of trial
was that the crime of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent did
not exist until 2017.15 The offense occurred in the fall of 2015, making the
2015 Montana Code the governing law.16 Over the objection of the
defense, the court allowed an amendment to the information reverting to
the original charge of sexual intercourse without consent.17

7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 4.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 5.
13
Id. at 6.
14
Id. at 6–7.
15
Id. at 7; See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-508 (2017).
16
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 8; See City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219, 1221 (Mont.
2020) (citations omitted) (“[T]he law in effect at the time of an alleged offense applies in criminal
prosecution.”).
17
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 4–6.
8

2021

PREVIEW: STATE V. LAFOURNAISE

31

Further complicating the matter were jury instructions used for
Count I (now sexual intercourse without consent) that listed the 2017
definition of consent.18 The defense did not object to these jury
instructions.19 The 2017 definition of “consent” required affirmative
consent indicating a “freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse . .
. .”20 The 2015 definition of “without consent” required the use of force.21
On appeal, LaFournaise argues the following: (i) the amendment
to the information was one of substance, therefore untimely and the Court
should reverse his conviction;22 and (ii) the missing force element of
“without consent” in the jury instructions prejudiced his substantial due
process rights and therefore, under plain error doctrine, the Court should
reverse his conviction.23
III.

AMENDMENTS OF SUBSTANCE / AMENDMENTS OF FORM

Proper analysis of LaFournaise’s first argument begins with an
introduction to informations and their amendments. “An information is a
written accusation of criminal conduct prepared by a prosecutor in the
name of the State.”24 The purpose of the information is for criminal
defendants to be aware of the conduct they are accused of violating so that
they may prepare a defense.25 An information can be amended in two
ways—in substance and in form.26
a. What is an amendment of substance?
Amendments of substance change the nature or elements of an
offense, thus requiring different proof or a different defense.27 If a court
gives leave to file the amendment, the defendant must be arraigned on the
new charges and given time to prepare a new defense.28 Because of the
burden of such an amendment on the defense, Montana law prohibits an
amendment of substance within five days of trial.29 In City of Red Lodge
v. Kennedy,30 the prosecution initially brought a charge under one subpart
of the stalking statute, which prohibited “harassing, threatening, or
18

Id. at 6.
Id.
20
§ 45-5-501 (2017) (amended 2019).
21
§ 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019).
22
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 12–18.
23
Id. at 18–24.
24
State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010).
25
Id.
26
§ 46-11-205 (2021).
27
City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 605 (Mont. 2002).
28
Id. at 604 (citing § 46-11-205 (2001)).
29
Id.
30
46 P.3d 602 (Mont. 2002).
19
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intimidating the stalked person . . . .”31 On the day of trial, the district court
gave leave for an amendment that updated the charge to the entire statute,
now inclusive of the act of “following the stalked person.”32 The
amendment further invoked another statute to prove that Kennedy’s acts
were a continuous course of conduct.33 Because the information added
elements that required a different defense, Kennedy argued the
amendment was one of substance, and therefore untimely as it was filed
within five days of trial.34 The Court agreed, noting that under the new
charges, the jury could find the defendant guilty without reliance on the
subpart of the stalking statute originally charged. Because the amendment
of substance was untimely, the Court reversed the conviction.35
b. What is an amendment of form?
Amendments of form are ministerial tasks that do not change the
elements of the crime charged, and therefore do not require different proof
or a different defense.36 Because an amendment in form does not prejudice
the substantial rights of a defendant, it may occur any time before the
verdict or finding is issued.37 In State v. Scheffer,38 a man suspected of
inserting his fingers into a woman’s vagina without consent slid his fingers
in and out of his mouth and wiped them on his jeans in anticipation of a
DNA test. The initial charge filed was tampering with or fabricating
physical evidence.39 When the results showed that in spite of the
defendant’s efforts, the test detected the woman’s DNA, the prosecutor
amended the charge to attempted tampering with or fabricating physical
evidence.40 Scheffer appealed on the grounds that the amendment was one
of substance, and untimely.41 The Court disagreed, and found that the
amendment was of form because tampering with evidence and attempting
to tamper with evidence both contained the same elements, but for the
“attempting” language.42

31

Id. at 604 (citing § 45-5-220(1)(b) (2001) (amended 2003, 2019)).
Id. (citing § 45-5-220 (2001) (amended 2003, 2019)).
33
Id. at 605.
34
Id. at 604.
35
Id.
36
State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010) (citation omitted).
37
Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-205(3) (2009)).
38
230 P.3d 462 (Mont. 2010).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 467.
41
Id. at 477.
42
Id.
32
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c. LaFournaise’s arguments
Here, LaFournaise claims that the amendment from the 2017
aggravated sexual intercourse without consent charge to the 2015 sexual
intercourse without consent charge was an amendment of substance for
two reasons: (i) “the amendment altered the defense strategy” to move for
dismissal based on charging error;43 and (ii) “the amendment altered the
essential consent element.”44 Both arguments are flawed.
i.

A windfall is not a right.

A defense strategy of hoping for dismissal due to a charging error is
not a substantial right. In Collins v. Youngblood,45 a defendant was unable
to capitalize on a Texas common-law rule that would have overturned his
conviction because he was both sentenced and charged a fine.46 Aware of
the loophole, the Texas legislature enacted law allowing the fine to be
deleted, thereby curing the error.47 Youngblood claimed a violation of his
rights under the ex post facto doctrine because the statute was enacted after
the commission of his offense.48 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the
new law inoffensive to the specific protections offered by the doctrine.49
To wit: the ex post facto doctrine did not shield the defendant from every
disadvantage arising from post-offense legislation, only violations of
substantial rights.50 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens added “[t]he mere
possibility of a capricious and unlikely windfall is not the sort of
procedural protection that could reasonably be judged substantial . . . .”51
Here, the substantial right the law protects by limiting amendments is
the right of the accused to build a defense based on the elements of their
charges and produce the proof required by that defense.52 Thus, in
Kennedy, when additional elements of stalking and a continuous course of
conduct changed the proof necessary to defend, the Court reversed the
43

Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 13–15.
Id. at 17.
45
497 U.S. 37 (1990).
46
Id. at 39–40.
47
Id. at 40.
48
Id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
49
Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 52 (“The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does
not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of
any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed.”).
50
Id. at 52–61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). LaFournaise invokes the ex post facto doctrine several times in
his brief. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 9, 19. The ex post facto doctrine is immaterial to
the disposition of this case. The takeaway of the Collins v. Youngblood passages—that a lucky error
is not a substantial right of the defendant—can apply to many constitutional contexts. Any mention
of the ex post facto doctrine is coincidental and not a response to LaFournaise’s ex post facto claims.
52
City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 604 (Mont. 2002).
44
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conviction.53 And in State v. Hardground,54 when the prosecution, on the
date of trial, altered the date the accused allegedly changed residence (a
critical element of the crime), the Court reversed the conviction because
the necessary proof the defense required changed.55 Here, the district court
did not violate LaFournaise’s substantial rights by depriving him of the
ability to move for dismissal based on charging error. The court’s decision
did not interfere with constructing a defense founded on the elements of
the crime. Nor did this decision alter the proof required to defend against
the elements of the crime. It simply deprived him of the “capricious
windfall” considered by Justice Stevens in Youngblood. Consequently, it
offended no constitutional or statutory protection.56
ii.

The amendment, by definition, was one of form.

The amendment to Count I of the information was one of form,
because the elements of the crimes before and after were identical. In
LaFournaise’s second argument, he confuses the analysis between
amendments of substance and form by subsuming his jury instruction
complaint into the comparison.57 He begins by discussing the confirmation
between the State and the district court that the pre- and post-amendment
crimes shared identical elements.58 He then detours into discussing the
2017 definition of consent’s appearance in the jury instructions.59 Jury
instructions are irrelevant in the determination of whether an amendment
is of form or substance because the analysis compares statutory elements.60
Implicit support for this proposition exists in the statute itself, as
amendments of substance require an “arraignment on the amended
information.”61 An arraignment on jury instructions, erroneous or not, is a
non-sequitur. The analysis of the amendment must instead compare the
previously charged statute, aggravated sexual intercourse without consent
§ 45-5-508 (2017) with sexual intercourse without consent § 45-5-503(1)
(2015).62
53

Id. at 605.
433 P.3d 711 (Mont. 2019).
Id. at 711–12, 714–15 (“Although an amendment to the date in an information might ordinarily
constitute an amendment of form . . . here, the number of days a sexual or violent offender has to
provide notice to the proper authorities of change of residence is an element of the offense charged .
. . .”).
56
Youngblood, 497 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 17.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 17–18.
60
See State v. Yecovenko, 95 P.3d 145, 149 (Mont. 2004) (statutes are the same so amendment is of
form). Cf. City of Red Lodge v. Kennedy, 46 P.3d 602, 605 (Mont. 2002) (comparing full stalking
statute and continuous course of conduct statute to one subpart of stalking statute and finding
amendment of substance).
61
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-205 (2021).
62
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1–2.
54
55
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§ 45-5-508 (2017)

§ 45-5-503(1) (2015)

A person who uses force while
knowingly
having
sexual
intercourse with another person
without consent or with another
person who is incapable of
consent commits the offense of
aggravated sexual intercourse
without consent.

A person who knowingly has
sexual intercourse without
consent with another person
commits the offense of sexual
intercourse without consent.

§ 45-5-501 (2015)
(1) (a) As used in 45-5-503, the
term "without consent" means: (i)
the victim is compelled to submit
by force against the victim or
another . . . .
The elements of the pre- and post-amendment statutes are identical.
The only difference is where the force element exists. Because the
elements of both crimes are the same, the amendment was one of form.63
Because the amendment was one of form, the amendment was timely as it
was effectuated before the verdict issued.64
IV.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Because they listed the 2017 definition of consent, the jury
instructions provided in Lewis and Clark County contained a misstatement
of the law.65 LaFournaise correctly notes that the 2017 definition of
consent does not include the force element required in 2015.66
a. Plain error review is appropriate.
Plain error doctrine review is appropriate because the defense’s claims
implicate his substantial rights of due process. LaFournaise did not object
to the jury instructions at trial.67 The Montana Supreme Court “generally
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal when the
appellant had the opportunity to make an objection at trial.”68 However,
the Court will review claims of error on appeal when they may “(1) result
in a manifest miscarriage of justice; (2) leave unsettled the question of the
63

State v. Scheffer, 230 P.3d 462, 477 (Mont. 2010).
§ 46-11-205; Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 2–3.
65
§ 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 1.
66
§ 45-5-501 (2017) (amended 2019); § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellant,
supra note 2, at 6.
67
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 6.
68
State v. Daniels, 448 P.3d 511, 518 (Mont. 2019).
64
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fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings; or (3) compromise the
integrity of the judicial process.”69 Claims concerning whether the State
properly instructed the jury on its burden of proof directly implicate the
fundamental fairness of the trial and thus qualify for plain error review.70
In State v. Daniels, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the
burden of convincing them plain error review was necessary,71 because the
jury instructions the defendant complained of were unrelated to the counts
the jury ultimately convicted him on.72
Here, plain error review is appropriate because LaFournaise’s
conviction rests on jury instructions whose language neglected to express
the force element of “without consent.”73 A basic tenet of a criminal
defendant’s due process rights is that “every fact necessary to constitute
the crime” must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.74 Without such a
standard, we risk “leav[ing] people in doubt that innocent men are being
condemned.”75
b. Improper jury instructions can be reversible error.
LaFournaise cites several cases where the Court overturned
convictions secured with incomplete jury instructions.76 In all of these
cases, the jury instructions provided an opportunity for the jury to convict
without finding an element the State had a burden to prove.77
In City of Missoula v. Zerbst, another jury instruction mix-up occurred
where a man defended himself against a sexual assault charge involving
an “on-and-off again” romantic interest.78 The alleged offense occurred in
July 2017, when the 2015 Montana Code governed.79 The instructions,
however, provided the 2017 definition of consent which included a new
bar to consent in situations where the victim suffered a mental disorder.80
The alleged victim in Zerbst had a history of mental disease.81 The State’s
burden under 2015 law was to prove “without consent” under the ordinary
69

Id. at 519 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 520.
72
Id.
73
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at
23–24.
74
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
75
Id.
76
Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 20–23. See generally City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d
1219 (Mont. 2020); State v. Resh, 448 P.3d 1100 (Mont. 2019); State v. Carnes, 346 P.3d 1120
(Mont. 2015).
77
Zerbst, 462 P.3d at 1226; Resh, 448 P.3d at 1105; Carnes, 346 P.3d at 1123.
78
Zerbst, 462 P.3d at 1220–22.
79
Id. at 1221–22.
80
Id. at 1222 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(b)(i) (2017) (amended 2019)).
81
Id. at 1223.
70
71
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meaning of those words.82 Because the jury could incorrectly presume a
lack of consent due to mental disorder, the Court reversed the conviction.83
In State v. Resh,84 the jury instructions, without objection, stated that
a person was incapable of consent to sexual assault if under the age of
sixteen.85 The law, however, provided for consent in persons aged fourteen
or older.86 The alleged victim, at the time of the offense, was fourteen years
old.87 Again in Resh, jury instructions that erroneously stated the law
offered an opportunity to convict without finding an element of the crime:
lack of consent.88 Consequently, the Court reversed on ineffective counsel
grounds.89
In State v. Carnes,90 a man charged with assault on a peace officer
built his defense based on his lack of knowledge that the men he assaulted
were officers.91 The jury instructions stated the jury only needed to find
the man’s awareness as to his conduct, not to the fact that the deputies
were peace officers.92 When the jury asked specifically whether Carnes
needed to be aware of the deputies’ positions, the district court declined to
answer and referred them back to the instructions.93 The Montana Supreme
Court held that this awareness was required, and because the jury had
opportunity to convict Carnes without finding it, questions of the
“fundamental fairness of the trial” remained.94 Consequently, the Court
reversed.95
c. Harmless Error
LaFournaise’s case is distinguishable. The common, fatal thread in
each of the preceding cases is the opportunity the jury had to convict
without necessarily finding a required element of the crime. Here, despite
the erroneous jury instructions, the jury could not have convicted
LaFournaise without finding the required “without consent” element. This
is because either (i) the jury found S.S. incapable of consent due to

82

Id. at 1226.
Id.
84
448 P.3d 1100 (Mont. 2019).
85
Id. at 1102.
86
Id. at 1104 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(5)(a)(ii) (2013) (amended 2019)).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1105.
89
Id.
90
346 P.3d 1120 (Mont. 2015).
91
Id. at 1123.
92
Id. at 1122.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1123.
95
Id.
83
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surprise; or (ii) it cannot be possible that the jury found the alleged conduct
occurred without also finding force occurred.
If the jury found S.S. incapable of consent due to surprise, the State
met their burden of proving “without consent.”96 In 2001, the Montana
legislature added deception, coercion, and surprise as bars to consent in
response to the reversal of a sexual intercourse without consent conviction
in State v. Haser.97 In Haser, the defendant, a professional photographer,
used the pretext of adjusting models’ poses as reason for placing his hands
under their attire and incidentally penetrating their vaginas with his
fingers.98 The State argued that the surprise of these attacks should satisfy
the force requirement of “without consent” because the victims had no
opportunity to offer consent before penetration.99 The Court found no
language in the statute to support such an argument and they reversed the
conviction.100 Because the legislature added “surprise” in response to this
holding,101 the facts of Haser suggest the type of acts contemplated by the
amendment—acts where penetration is the source of surprise.102 The State,
in its brief, considers it a likely outcome that the jury found S.S. was
incapable of consent due to the surprise of LaFournaise’s attack.103 The
period of time between LaFournaise’s arrival on his bicycle and
penetration expands the boundaries of immediacy drawn by Haser, but
lacking a definition in either the statute or the jury instructions, the jury
certainly could determine what “surprise” meant to them and whether they
found it.104 If they did find it, the State proved the “without consent”
element of the crime.105 Either way, as explained below, the jury found
force.
The Constitution does not guarantee an error-free trial, and the Court
will rightly ignore errors found to be harmless.106 “[I]n the absence of
error that renders a trial fundamentally unfair . . . a conviction should be
affirmed where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial

96

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2015) (current version at § 45-5-501(1)(b)(iii) (2021)).
20 P.3d 100 (Mont. 2001); § 45-5-501(1)(b)(iii); John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still
Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual
Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1141–42 (2011).
98
Haser, 20 P.3d at 102–03.
99
Id. at 107, 109.
100
Id. at 110.
101
Decker & Baroni, supra note 97, at 1141–42.
102
Haser, 20 P.3d at 103, 107.
103
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 29.
104
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019); Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at
3, 23–24.
105
§ 45-5-501 (2015) (amended 2017, 2019).
106
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1983).
97
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established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”107 In Pope v. Illinois,108
members of the jury were instructed to find whether “allegedly obscene
magazines” violated a community standard of value when the correct test
required an objective reasonable person standard.109 The Court held that
the error in the instructions was harmless if no rational juror could have
found the magazines of no value under one test without finding similarly
under the other.110 In Rose v. Clark,111 a Tennessee court improperly
instructed the jury that they could presume malice, a necessary element,
by the mere existence of a homicide.112 Such presumptions were (and are)
unconstitutional because they remove the prosecutor’s burden of proving
an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.113 The Clark Court,
however, found that such an error could be harmless if a reviewing court
could find malice in the predicate facts.114 It stated “[i]n many cases, the
predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could
find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not
intend to cause injury.”115 It recognized that inference based on conduct is
often the necessary path a jury takes to reach intent.116 The Montana
Supreme Court, in State v. Scarborough,117 found harmless error where an
erroneous jury instruction “could have had no effect on the outcome of the
trial.”118
These principles apply to LaFournaise because the “force” necessary
for conviction was built-in to the conduct found by the jury. LaFournaise
“jumped off his bicycle and grabbed S.S. from behind.”119 LaFournaise
“pushed S.S. down and told her he was going to hurt her.” He repeatedly
told her “You need to be quiet” as she “screamed for him to get off her.”
He “pinned S.S.’s hands/arms above her head with his left hand and pulled
her shorts down with his right hand.” He “took down his own shorts and
positioned his knees between S.S.’s legs and inserted his penis into her
vagina.”120 Just as in Pope, no rational juror could have found these acts
occurred and not found force. Just as in Clark, the predicate facts
107

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1987) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108
481 U.S. 497 (1987).
109
Id. at 503; Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
110
Pope, 481 U.S. at 503.
111
478 U.S. 570 (1986).
112
Id. at 574–75.
113
See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
114
Clark, 478 U.S. at 580.
115
Id. at 580–81.
116
Id. at 581.
117
14 P.3d 1202 (Mont. 2001).
118
Id. at 1214.
119
Brief of Appellee, supra note 5, at 3.
120
Id.
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conclusively establish force. And just as in Scarborough, the error
omitting force cannot possibly have influenced the outcome of the trial,
because force is so manifestly implicit in everything LaFournaise did.
Because the jury instruction error did not prejudice the outcome of
LaFournaise’s trial, the error was harmless.121
V.

CONCLUSION

Because the amendment of form to Count I was timely, and because
the error omitting a required finding of force from the jury instructions
was harmless, I anticipate the Montana Supreme Court will affirm
LaFournaise’s conviction of sexual intercourse without consent.

121

City of Missoula v. Zerbst, 462 P.3d 1219, 1224 (Mont. 2020) (citing State v. Scarborough, 14
P.3d 1202 (Mont. 2001)).

